Threat Analyzer

Check a file you are unsure about for the tricks attackers use: a real type that does not match the name, double extensions, hidden direction characters, macros, PDF JavaScript, HTML smuggling and programs hidden inside. It reads the file in your browser and never runs it. It is not antivirus.

Analyzer Media & Files Updated Oct 16, 2026
How to Use
  1. Drop the file on the box, or click it to choose one. It is read as bytes in your browser: nothing is opened, run or uploaded.
  2. Read the verdict: Red flags, Be careful or No red flags, with the number of each.
  3. Go through the list on the right. Every flag says what was found and why it matters; the checklist drawing shows which tests applied to this kind of file.
  4. Copy the SHA-256 if you want a second opinion: the VirusTotal link sends only that hash, and only if you click it.
  5. For a Windows program, continue in the EXE Analyzer; for anything you were not expecting, ask the sender through another channel before opening it.
Input
A static red-flag check, not antivirus. It reads the file and never runs it. “No red flags” does not mean safe.
Drop the file you are unsure about, or
Read on your device, never opened, never uploaded
No file chosen yet.
Presets (harmless samples made in your browser)
What Was Checked
Verdict
—
Red flags
—
Warnings
—
Real type
—

Worked Example

An invoice that is a program. “Invoice_2026-10.pdf.exe” arrives by email. Its first two bytes are 4D 5A (“MZ”), which every Windows program starts with, and its name ends in .pdf followed by .exe. Windows hides known extensions by default, so the reader sees “Invoice_2026-10.pdf” with a document-like icon if the attacker added one. Result: a red flag for the double extension, plus a note that it is a program to examine in the EXE Analyzer.

A name that reads backwards. “holiday-photo[U+202E]gpj.exe” contains the right-to-left override character U+202E, which displays everything after it reversed, so the file appears as “holiday-photoexe.jpg”. Its real extension is still .exe. Ordinary file names have no reason to contain this character, so its presence alone is a red flag.

The common mistake: reading “no red flags” as “safe”. The plain CSV sample passes every check, and so would a malicious PDF that hides its JavaScript in compressed object streams, or an image built to exploit a bug in one particular viewer. This tool finds disguises and risky features; it cannot prove a file harmless. If you did not expect the file, verify with the sender through another channel and check the SHA-256 with a scanning service.

Show Work

Check a file or press a preset to see each test and its evidence.

How the Checks Work

Real type
first bytes ≠ extension ⇒ flag
4D 5A = Windows program, 7F 45 4C 46 = Linux program, 50 4B 03 04 = ZIP
Double extension
name.document.runnable
.pdf.exe, .jpg.scr, .doc.js, .pdf.lnk
Direction characters
U+202A–U+202E, U+2066–U+2069
Reverse or reorder how a name is displayed
Office macros
vbaProject.bin or _VBA_PROJECT
The macro storage of .docm/.xlsm and of old .doc/.xls files
PDF and HTML
/JavaScript + /OpenAction · atob + Blob + download
Code that runs on opening · a file built in the browser
Entropy
H = −Σ pi log2 pi
Near 8 bits per byte: compressed or encrypted

Background: How Malicious Files Disguise Themselves

Most attacks by attachment depend on the victim opening something they believe is harmless, so the disguise matters as much as the payload. MITRE ATT&CK, the public catalogue of attacker techniques, describes the ones this tool looks for: double file extensions that rely on Windows hiding known extensions (T1036.007), the right-to-left override character U+202E that makes an executable’s name display reversed (T1036.002), container files such as .iso and .vhd whose contents may not carry the Mark of the Web that triggers Windows warnings (T1553.005), and HTML smuggling, where a web page assembles a file from data in its own script so that no filter ever sees the file itself (T1027.006).

Documents that run code are the other half. Microsoft Office keeps macros in a separate VBA storage (described in Microsoft’s [MS-OVBA] specification), which in the newer formats is a part named vbaProject.bin; the formats ending in “m” (.docm, .xlsm) are the ones meant to carry it. PDF files can contain JavaScript and actions that run when the document opens or that launch other files. None of these features is malicious in itself, which is why the tool explains each finding instead of declaring a file infected.

About This Tool

This tool reads a file you are unsure about and lists the red flags it finds: a disguised type or name, features that run code, macros, risky archive contents, PDF actions, HTML smuggling, commands that download or run programs, and programs hidden inside other files. It scans the whole file in slices, so large files are covered, and gives the SHA-256 so you can look the file up elsewhere. It does not run the file and is not a replacement for antivirus or for checking with the sender.

Everything stays on your device; nothing is uploaded, and the optional hash lookup sends only the hash when you click it. It suits anyone who has received an unexpected attachment, help-desk staff triaging reports, and anyone learning how phishing files are built.

Related tools: Hex Editor, ZIP & Unzip Tool and APK Analyzer.

Frequently Asked Questions

Is this an antivirus scanner?

No. Antivirus compares files with millions of known threats and watches what programs do. This tool looks for the tricks that make a file dangerous or misleading, such as a program pretending to be a PDF, a document with macros or a web page that builds a download. That catches many phishing attachments, but a file with no red flags can still be harmful, and a file with a flag can be innocent.

Is it safe to drop a suspicious file here?

Yes. The browser reads the file as plain bytes; nothing in it is opened, rendered or run, and it is not uploaded. Reading a program cannot start it. After checking, simply do not open the file itself if the result worries you.

What exactly does it check?

The real type from the first bytes against the name; double extensions such as .pdf.exe; direction-control characters such as U+202E, which make “photo[U+202E]gpj.exe” display as “photoexe.jpg”; types that run code (programs, scripts, shortcuts, disk images); Office macros and embedded objects; programs, double extensions, passwords and ../ paths inside ZIP files; PDF JavaScript, automatic actions, /Launch and attachments; HTML smuggling and password forms; command lines such as powershell -enc; and a Windows program hidden inside another file.

Why do disk images and password-protected ZIPs count as warnings?

Both are ways around protections. Windows marks downloaded files with a “Mark of the Web” that triggers extra warnings, but files inside a mounted .iso or .vhd may not inherit it, which is why MITRE ATT&CK lists disk images as a way to bypass that mark. A ZIP with a password cannot be scanned by email filters, so the password is simply put in the email next to it.

Why might a dangerous file show no red flags?

Because some threats leave no simple trace: an exploit hidden in an image or font, a PDF whose JavaScript sits inside compressed object streams, a script that builds its commands from fragments, or a program that is malicious but looks ordinary. That is why the result says “no red flags”, never “safe”. Check the SHA-256 with a scanning service and confirm with the sender when in doubt.

How do I use the Threat Analyzer?

Simply type your numbers and read the result, which refreshes the instant you change something. There is nothing to submit and nothing to wait for.

Does it cost anything or need an account?

No. The tool is completely free, there is no account to create, and it keeps working offline after the page first loads.

Is anything I type uploaded?

No. The tool works entirely on your device, so the values you enter never leave your browser.

Common Use Cases

An unexpected email attachment

“Invoice_2026-10.pdf.exe” starts with 4D 5A: a Windows program with a double extension, flagged red.

A “document” from a stranger

Q3-report.docx that contains word/vbaProject.bin carries macros a .docx cannot normally hold.

An HTML attachment

A Remittance_Advice.html that decodes data with atob, wraps it in a Blob and sets a download name is HTML smuggling.

A ZIP with a password in the email

payment.zip holding “Payment details.pdf.exe” behind a password: two red flags before you ever unzip it.

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